Taxes, Regulations, and Asset Prices by Ellen R. McGrattan & Edward C. Prescott
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We wish to thank seminar participants at Wharton, Northwestern, Yale, Columbia, UCLA, the University
of Chicago, the Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis and Richmond, the NBER, and the SED for their
helpful comments and suggestions. We especially thank Andy Abel, Alan Auerbach, John Cochrane, Bob
Hall, Ravi Jagannathan, Urban Jermann, Narayana Kocherlakota, Jim Poterba, and Bob Shiller. Prescott
thanks the National Science Foundation for financial support. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
' 2001 by Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including '
notice, is given to the source.Taxes, Regulations, and Asset Prices
Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott
NBER Working Paper No. 8623
December 2001
JEL No. G12, H30, E13
ABSTRACT
U.S. stock prices have increased much faster than gross domestic product (GDP) in the postwar
period. Between 1962 and 2000, corporate equity value relative to GDP nearly doubled. In this paper, we
determine what standard growth theory says the equity value should be in 1962 and 2000, the two years
for which our steady-state assumption is a reasonable one. We find that the actual valuations were close
to the theoretical predictions in both years. The reason for the large run-up in equity value relative to GDP
is that the average tax rate on dividends fell dramatically between 1962 and 2000. We also find that, given
legal constraints that effectively prohibited the holding of stocks as reserves for pension plans, there is
no equity premium puzzle in the postwar period. The average returns on debt and equity are as theory
predicts.
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U.S. stock prices have increased much faster than gross domestic product (GDP) in
the postwar period. Between 1962 and 2000, corporate equity value relative to GDP nearly
doubled. (See Figure 1.) Stock market analysts view this as puzzling because there has been
little or no change in market fundamentals. The increase in equity values is not the result
of a decrease in the importance of debt ﬁnancing; in both periods, debt was a little over 3
percent of the value of corporate equity. The increase is not due to an increase in the value
of productive tangible assets owned by corporations relative to GDP; the corporate capital-
output ratio has stayed remarkably constant. The increase is not the result of an increase in
the after-tax corporate proﬁts share of GDP; this share is approximately the same now as it
was in the early 1960s.
There is another important factor that aﬀects the value of corporate equity, however.
This factor is the U.S. tax system, which changed and changed a lot. Once the change in tax
system is taken into account, we ﬁnd that the value of corporate equity is very close to the
predictions of theory in both 1962 and 2000.
T h ek e yf e a t u r eo ft h et a xs y s t e mt h a ta ﬀects the value of corporate equity is the
average tax rate on dividends. This rate has fallen from 44 percent in the 1955—1962 period
to 18 percent in the 1987—2000 period. There are two reasons for the big decline in this rate.
First, there were three important cuts in individual income tax rates between 1962 and 1987.
The ﬁrst was the 1964 Kennedy tax cut that reduced the highest marginal income tax rate
from 91 percent to 70 percent. Next, there was the 1981 Reagan tax cut that reduced the
highest rate to 50 percent. Finally, there was the 1986 Tax Reform Act that reduced the
highest rate to 33 percent.
Second, and more importantly, there was a dramatic increase in the share of corporate
1equity held by non-tax-paying entities. The percentage of corporate equity held by these
entities — namely pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and nonproﬁt organizations
— increased from a few percent in 1962 to around 50 percent in 2000.
In the early 1960s virtually no equity was held in non-taxed retirement accounts, in
large part because of strict regulations on ﬁduciaries. Regulations governing investment by
pension funds were changed in 1974 with the passage of the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).1 Prior to 1974, ﬁduciaries managing a pension fund portfolio were
liable if the portfolio included equity and the value of this equity fell.2 With ERISA, pension
funds became regulated intermediaries; if regulators approved investments, then the ﬁduciary
managing the portfolio was not liable for losses. During the period following the change in
law, there was a signiﬁcant increase in pension fund equity holdings.
Beginning with ERISA and continuing into the early 1980s, there were major changes
in tax law that fostered individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and deﬁned contribution pen-
sion plans. The funds in these retirement plans are invested in individual accounts, with
the individual typically having considerable latitude in how these funds will be invested. A
consequence of these tax law changes is that these plans grew rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s
with a large share of assets being corporate equity.
Contributions to most retirement accounts are not taxed and grow tax-free until they
are withdrawn for consumption. Although these funds are taxed upon withdrawal, this tax
is in eﬀect a consumption tax, not a dividend tax. Consequently, the marginal tax rates on
these distributions have no consequence for the steady-state value of corporate equity relative
to GDP.
Using the basic growth model, we derive a formula for the value of equity. The value
of equity is diﬀerent from the value of corporate productive capital because of taxes. Given
2U.S. tax policy, the most important tax for pricing equity is the tax on dividend income. In
theory, a decrease in the marginal rate on dividends should increase the price of capital used
in the corporate sector, but leave the quantity of capital unaﬀected. This is exactly what
we observed: prices of equities rose between 1962 and 2000, while the capital-output ratio
remained roughly constant. Furthermore, if the capital-output ratio does not change, then we
would not expect a rise in after-tax corporate earnings as a share of GDP unless the corporate
tax rate fell. Over the postwar period, the corporate tax rate did not fall signiﬁcantly, and
after-tax earnings remained roughly constant as a share of GDP.
Another implication of the theory is that the real before-tax return on the stock
market should have been about 8 percent on average, as it was. The real before-tax return
on equity is the sum of three returns: the income return, the anticipated capital gain, and
the unanticipated capital gain. The income return is the ratio of dividend to price. This
ratio has been high, over 3 percent, for much of the postwar period because high tax rates
have implied a low price of equity. Recently it has come way down and is now a little over 1
percent.
The anticipated capital gain is equal to the growth rate of productive assets, which
was roughly 3.5 percent per year and is now down to around 3.3 percent. The unanticipated
capital gain is the growth in the price of equity due to unanticipated changes in tax rates.
This growth rate has changed, falling from the range of 1 to 2 percent to 0 percent. Adding
these rates, we would expect an 8 percent (e.g., 3+3.5+1.5) real before-tax stock return in
the early postwar period and, barring any further unexpected changes in tax rates, a return
in the future that is a little over 4 percent (e.g., 1+3.3+0).
This raises the question, why was debt held if equity earned such a high return? In the
early 1960s, over one-third of the 1.1 GDP of debt held directly or indirectly by households
3was held as pension and life insurance reserves. At that time, almost all of the assets held
in these reserves were debt assets. The reason is that there were legal constraints imposed
on ﬁduciaries to ensure suﬃcient liquidity for timely distributions and to ensure prudent
investing. A large amount of debt assets were also held directly by households for liquidity
purposes. For some households in the early postwar period, debt assets were their main avenue
for saving because transaction costs made holding a diversiﬁed stock portfolio infeasible.
An important corollary of our ﬁndings is that there is no equity premium puzzle in
the postwar period. Mehra and Prescott (1985) found that the high return on equity relative
to debt was puzzling because theory says that the premium for bearing non-diversiﬁable
risk is small. Their ﬁnding lead many to conclude that growth theory cannot account for the
historical facts concerning asset prices and returns, unless a fundamentally diﬀerent preference
ordering is assumed.3 We ﬁnd that this is not the case once we take into account observed
changes in taxes and regulations.4
In Section 2, we describe the basic growth model that we use for our analysis. We start
with a version of the model that highlights our main results. We then extend the analysis to
include many features of the U.S. economy. In Section 3, we describe the U.S. data that we
use. In Section 4, we compare the model’s predictions for corporate equity values with the
actual market valuations. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the implications for asset returns.
2. Theory
In this section, we derive a formula that relates the value of corporate equity to the
value of the productive assets in the corporate sector.5 We use the value of the productive
assets of U.S. corporations to estimate what the value of their equity should be. If the value
of a ﬁrm’s productive assets is lower than the market value of its shares, then we would say
4that its equity is overvalued. Conversely, if the value of its productive assets is higher than
the market value of its shares, then its equity is undervalued.
We ﬁrst present a simple model that highlights our key theoretical results. We include
only personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. We also assume that the economy
has only one sector, a corporate sector. This is all that we need to show how taxes aﬀect the
relation between the value of corporate assets and the value of corporate equity. In the second
step, we extend the analysis to include suﬃcient details of the U.S. economy — especially in
relation to the tax code — to allow us to take the theory to the data. We match the model
up with national income and product account (NIPA) capital stock data from the Survey
of Current Business (SCB) and tax data from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of
Income (SOI). The result is a prediction for the value of corporate equity that does not rely
on any ﬁnancial data. This prediction can then be compared to the actual stock market
valuation.
A. Income Taxation and the Value of Corporate Equity
Consider the following model economy. The economy is inhabited by inﬁnitely lived





t U(ct,` t)( 1 )
where t indexes time, c is per-capita consumption, and ` is the fraction of productive time
allocated to nonmarket activities. The fraction of time allocated by households to market
activities is denoted by n =1− `.6
5Each household chooses sequences of consumption and leisure to maximize utility
subject to its budget constraint,
X
t
pt{ct + Vt(st+1 − st)} =
X
t
pt{(1 − τpers)(dtst + wtnt)+ξt}. (2)
This constraint says that the present discounted value of expenditures must be less than or
equal to the present discounted value of after-tax income. Expenditures of the household
are consumption and purchases of shares in stocks, Vt(st+1 − st), where st is the number of
shares held in period t and Vt is the price per share. Income for the households is from three
sources: dividends, wages, and government transfers. We denote dividends per share by d,
the wage rate by w, and government transfers by ξ. The households pay personal taxes on
dividend and wage income. The tax rate is equal to τpers.
Firms have capital and hire labor to produce output with a constant-returns-to-scale
production technology,7
yt = f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt). (3)
This speciﬁcation assumes that ﬁrms use both tangible assets, which are measured, km,a n d
intangible assets, which are unmeasured, ku. Tangible assets include structures, equipment,
inventories, and land. Intangible assets include brand names, patents, and forms of organi-
zational capital. In addition to capital, labor services n are required. The zt’s are technology
parameters, which are assumed to grow at rate γ.
Firms choose capital and labor to maximize:
∞ X
t=0
pt{f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt) − wtnt − xm,t − xu,t
−τcorp [f(kmt,k ut,z tnt) − wtnt − δmkm,t − xu,t]}(1 − τpers)( 4 )
6s.t.k m,t+1 =( 1− δm)km,t + xm,t (5)
ku,t+1 =( 1− δu)ku,t + xu,t (6)
where xm is new investment in measured tangible capital and xu is new investment in un-
measured intangible capital.
We are interested in the competitive equilibrium for this economy. A requirement for
equilibrium is that all markets clear. Labor markets clear if `t + nt = 1. The goods market
clears if
ct + xm,t + xu,t = f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt). (7)
Finally, dividends of the household are equal to what ﬁrms have after paying wages, paying
taxes, and making new investments; that is,
dt =( 1− τcorp)[f(km,t,k u,t,z tnt) − wtnt − δmkm,t − xu,t] − km,t+1 + km,t. (8)
The number of shares outstanding is one so equity markets clear if st =1 .









=( 1− τcorp)(f1(km,t+1,k u,t+1,z t+1nt+1) − δm)+1 ( 1 0 )
pt
pt+1
= f2(km,t+1,k u,t+1,z t+1nt+1) − δu +1 . (11)
Conditions (10) and (11) say, among other things, that the returns to stocks and the two
types of capital must be equal.
7Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the value of corporate equity is
Vt =( 1− τpers)[km,t+1 +( 1− τcorp)ku,t+1]. (12)
Proof: This follows from the deﬁnition of dividends in (8) and relations (9)-(11).
The price of tangible capital for the shareholders is (1−τpers) ,n o to n e .I ti sl e s st h a n
one because a dollar reinvested is not taxed, but a dollar distributed is taxed. The price of
intangible capital is (1 − τpers)(1 − τcorp). Thus, intangible capital is cheaper than tangible
capital when there is a tax on corporate income. The reason is that investments in intangible
capital are expensed and reduce taxable corporate income.
We note that our formula in (12) is not the standard formula in the public ﬁnance
literature.8 The standard formula for the price of measured capital is (1 − τpers)/(1 − τcg),
where τcg is a tax on accrued capital gains. In the U.S. tax system, however, capital gains
are taxed upon realization. The price of measured capital is (1 − τpers) if corporations make
distributions to households by paying dividends, and it is (1 − τcg) if corporations make
distributions by buying back shares. If a combination of the two is used, the price will be
intermediate to these two prices.
If we divide both sides of (12) by output, we have a relation between the ratio of
corporate equity relative to GDP, V/y, and the capital-output ratios. In the United States,
there was a large increase in the ratio of corporate equity to GDP, but little change in the
capital-output ratios. We argue that these observations are consistent with theory. The large
increase in equity values is the result of a dramatic decline in personal income tax rates. As
we show in the next proposition, a decline in tax rates has an eﬀect on the price of equity
but not the capital-output ratios.
Proposition 2. Steady-state ratios km/y and ku/y do not change with a change in τpers.
8Proof: To see why, we need only consider equations (10) and (11). By our assumption that f
is a constant-returns-to-scale technology, we can rewrite its derivatives f1 and f2 as functions
of km/y and ku/y only. The left-hand sides of these equations, both given by pt/pt+1,c a nb e
written in terms of the growth rate γ, the discount factor β, and the parameters of U(·,·).
This yields two equations in the two unknown capital-output ratios. The equations do not
depend on the personal income tax rate τpers. They do depend on the corporate income tax
rate τcorp.
In this economy, to get a large rise in the value of equities with little change in capital-
output ratios, we would need a large fall in the personal tax rate and little or no change in
the corporate tax rate.
B. The U.S. Tax System and the Value of Corporate Equity
We now extend the model to include details relevant to the U.S. economy. There are
two main extensions. First, we allow for two sectors — corporate and noncorporate. Even
though our primary focus is on corporate equity, the corporate sector accounts for less than
60 percent of U.S. value added and has only one-third of tangible assets. Second, we include
the primary sources of U.S. tax revenues. We include taxes on consumption, taxes on labor
income, taxes on dividend income, taxes on corporate income, and taxes on property.9 We
will show that the basic pricing formula does not change for this more general model economy.
We will denote the corporate sector as sector 1 and the noncorporate sector as sector
2. The outputs of these two sectors are inputs in production of a composite good that can
be used for consumption and investment,
ct + gt + x1m,t + x1u,t + x2,t ≤ yt = F(y1,t,y 2,t)( 1 3 )
where t indexes time, c is private consumption, g is government consumption, x1m is gross
9investment in tangible capital in the corporate sector (sector 1), x1u is gross investment in
intangible capital in the corporate sector, x2 is gross investment in the noncorporate sector
(sector 2), and F(y1,y 2) is total output.
We assume that the only inputs used in the noncorporate sector are tangible capital
and labor. R&D takes place in the pharmaceutical company but not at the corner drugstore.
The noncorporate production technology is therefore simpler:
y2,t ≤ f
nc(k2,t,z tn2,t). (14)
Here y2 is sector output, k2 is capital services, n2 is labor services, and z is a technology
parameter that grows at the rate γ. With two sectors, output in the corporate sector is now
denoted
y1,t ≤ f
c(k1m,t,k 1u,t,z tn1,t). (15)
Here y1 is the output of sector 1, k1m is capital services for measured tangible capital, k1u is
capital services for unmeasured intangible capital, n1 is labor services, and z is a technology
parameter which is assumed to be the same in the two sectors.
As before, corporate ﬁrms choose capital and labor sequences to maximize
∞ X
t=0
pt {p1,ty1,t − wtn1,t − x1m,t − x1u,t (16)
−τ1[p1,ty1,t − wtn1,t − ˆ δ1mˆ k1m,t − τ1kk1m,t − x1u,t] − τ1kk1m,t}(1 − τd)
subject to constraints (15) and
k1m,t+1 =[ ( 1 − δ1m)k1m,t + x1m,t]/(1 + η)( 1 7 )
10ˆ k1m,t+1 =[ ( 1 − ˆ δ1m)ˆ k1m,t + x1m,t]/(1 + η)( 1 8 )
k1u,t+1 =[ ( 1 − δ1u)k1u,t + x1u,t]/(1 + η)( 1 9 )
where p1 is the price of corporate goods, w is the wage rate, τ1 is the corporate tax rate,
τ1k is the tax rate on corporate property, k1m is the actual tangible capital stock, and ˆ k1m
is the book value of tangible capital.10 The right side of the capital accumulation equations
(17)-(19) are divided by the growth in population, (1 + η), because stocks and investments
are in per capita units.
In writing the corporate ﬁrm’s problem, we have distinguished depreciation used in the
ﬁrm’s calculation of corporate income tax, ˆ δ1mˆ k1m, and true economic depreciation, δ1mk1m.
These values are also distinguished in the U.S. national accounts.
Noncorporate ﬁrms solve a similar problem but face a diﬀerent set of taxes. The




pt{p2,ty2,t − wtn2,t − x2,t − τ2kk2,t}(1 − τ2)( 2 0 )
subject to the production technology (14) and
k2,t+1 =[ ( 1− δ2)k2,t + x2,t]/(1 + η)( 2 1 )
where p2 is the price of noncorporate goods, τ2 is the tax rate on noncorporate income, and
τ2k is the tax rate on property in the noncorporate sector.
Firms make distributions to households, who are the shareholders in the case of corpo-
rate ﬁrms, or proprietors, in the case of noncorporate ﬁrms. The household maximizes utility













pt{(1 − τd)d1,ts1,t + d2,ts2,t + bt +( 1− τn)wtnt + ξt} (23)
with nt + `t =1a n dbt ≥ ¯ bt. In this version of the problem, we also allow for population
growth. We assume that there are Nt =( 1+η)t household members in period t. Per capita
distributions from corporate and noncorporate ﬁrms are denoted d1,t and d2,t, respectively.
The values of shares held in corporate and noncorporate ﬁrms are V1s,ts1,t and V2s,ts2,t,r e -
spectively, where V is the price and s is the number of shares held. The total number of
shares outstanding is normalized to 1 in each sector. Government bonds are also held and
denoted by b.11 The price of these bonds is Vb. Taxes are paid on corporate dividends at
rate τd. Taxes are also paid on wage income at rate τn. Earlier we assumed that these rates
were the same. But, in comparing this model to the U.S. economy, we want to allow for
the fact that the marginal rate paid on dividend income is higher than that paid on labor
income since it is paid on average by households in higher income brackets. Transfers of the
government in (23) are denoted by ξ.
The constraint on debt in (23) is a reduced-form way to capture certain restrictions
that historically were imposed on U.S. ﬁduciaries. Pension fund managers face stiﬀ penalties
for imprudence and misconduct. Prior to the ERISA in 1974, there were few guidelines on
what constituted imprudent behavior. Fiduciary breaches were dealt with in the U.S. courts,
case by case. During this period, pension fund portfolios were primarily debt assets. Penalties
were likely to be avoidable if pension fund managers simply chose debt assets with diﬀerent
12maturities. This choice would facilitate the timing of distributions and would avoid large
movements in asset returns. ERISA clariﬁed ﬁduciary responsibilities and thus encouraged
greater investment in equity assets. We think of this change in the law as a change in the
constraints on debt holdings.12
If debt constraints are not binding, then the equilibrium return on debt is equal to the
interest rate, which is pinned down by preference parameters. If the constraints are binding,
however, then the equilibrium return on debt falls below the interest rate.
Government production is included in the noncorporate sector. Government purchases
and transfers are ﬁnanced by tax receipts and debt issues. The period t government budget
constraint must be satisﬁed each period and is given by
gt + ξt + bt ≤ Vb,tbt+1
− τ1[p1,ty1,t − wtn1,t − δ1mk1m,t − τ1kk1m,t − x1u,t] − τ1kk1m,t
− τ2[p2,ty2,t − wtn2,t − δ2k2,t − τ2kk2,t] − τ2kk2,t
+ τcct + τdd1,ts1,t + τnwtnt.
Note that tax rates are constant and proportional in our model economy.
Proposition 3. T h et o t a lv a l u eo fc o r p o r a t ee q u i t y ,Vt ≡ V1s,tNt,i s
Vt =( 1− τd)[(1− τδ)K1m,t+1 +( 1− τ1)K1u,t+1]( 2 4 )
where capital letters denote aggregates,
τδ =
τ1ˆ δ1m(ˆ δ1m − δ1m)
(ˆ δ1m + i)(ˆ δ1m + γ + η)
(25)
13and i is equal to the after-tax real return on the steady-state balanced growth path.
Proof: See Appendix A.
If the rate of depreciation allowed by the IRS is equal to the true rate of depreciation,
the formula in (24) is the same as that derived earlier in (12). This follows from the fact
that τd is the personal income tax on dividends and τ1 is the corporate income tax. It is
important to note that no other tax rates aﬀect the corporate equity value.
In most years, depreciation allowances for corporate tax ﬁlers exceed true economic
depreciation. In other words, corporations can subtract ˆ δ1mˆ k1m from their proﬁts when com-
puting their taxable income, where ˆ δ1mˆ k1m > δ1mk1m. The more generous the depreciation
allowances, the lower the consumption cost of tangible capital.
Proposition 4. k1m/y and k1u/y do not change with a change in τd.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We ﬁnd, as in the simpler model with only income taxes, that the steady state capital-
output ratio does not change if we change the tax rate on personal dividend income, τd.I n
fact, if the eﬀective tax rate on labor income (τn) does not change when we change τd and
if tax payments are lump-sum rebated, then we ﬁnd that the levels of capital and output do
not change. This says that a change in the tax rate on dividend income aﬀects only the price
of corporate equity and nothing else. This will be important when we consider the U.S. data.
3. U.S. Tax Rates and Capital Stocks
We analyze two time periods: the period after the Korean War and before the Kennedy
tax cuts and the period after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The speciﬁc years that we use
14are 1955 through 1962 and 1987 through 2000. During these periods, there were no major
changes in tax policy or regulations concerning asset markets. Thus, we view these periods
as stable and suitable for steady-state analysis. We also think that it is reasonable to assume
that individuals in the early 1960s did not anticipate the large tax and regulatory changes
that would come later.
For this analysis, we need measures of U.S. tax rates and U.S. capital stocks. We use
these measures in our key formula, equation (24).
A. Tax Rates
There are three rates that we need to estimate in order to calculate our predicted
equity value. The ﬁrst and quantitatively most important rate is the tax rate on dividend
income, τd. Dividends are taxed as ordinary income, and individual income tax rates —
especially for the top income brackets — have changed dramatically since World War II. The
top marginal rate in 1947 was 91 percent; it remained at this level until 1962, except for a
slight increase to 92 percent in 1952 and 1953. The Kennedy tax cut reduced the top rate to
70 percent. The Reagan administration further decreased it, ﬁr s tt o5 0p e r c e n ti n1 9 8 1a n d
then to 33 percent after 1986. Under Clinton, the top rate rose to 39.6 percent.
Tax Rate on Dividend Income
For our purposes, the relevant tax rate is the marginal rate paid on an additional
dollar of dividend income. An empirical issue is how to estimate this rate given there are
many types of taxpayers in the U.S. economy and only one type in our model. Using taxable
incomes reported to the IRS, we compute a marginal rate for each type of ﬁl e rr e p o r t e di nt h e
Statistics of Income and then weight each rate by the fraction of dividend income that this
group earned. In eﬀect, we compute an average marginal rate with the weights conditional
15on the amount of dividend income earned. Thus, if the only group that earned dividend
income was the highest income group, then the tax rate we would compute would be the top
marginal rate.
We use both 1040 returns ﬁled by individuals and 1041 returns ﬁled by ﬁduciaries. For
individuals, we can compute marginal rates by adjusted income class and by marital status.
For ﬁduciaries, we compute tax rates by income class. In Appendix B, Table B1, we report
the marginal rates for the 1040 ﬁlers and 1041 ﬁlers for each year and provide more details
on our computation.
The average marginal rates for 1040 ﬁlers fell in the range of 45 to 48 percent during
the early period that we consider. The average rate was 46.6 percent. It is important to note
that the rates remain roughly constant. Our analysis is only appropriate for stable policy
regimes. In the later years, for which we have data through 1997, we see rates in the range
of 24 to 29 percent with the average equal to 26.3. Again, we see that the rates stay roughly
constant — but at a much lower level than in the 1950s and 1960s. To compute an overall
rate, we average the estimates for 1040 and 1041 forms, again using the dividend incomes
earned as weights. Quantitatively, the averaged rates are close to the rates from the 1040
forms since most dividend income is earned directly by individuals.
The IRS forms 1040 and 1041 cover personal income taxes paid to the federal gov-
ernment. There has been a shift over time with federal income tax receipts falling and state
and local income tax receipts rising. So that we do not bias our estimates, we adjust the
rates to account for state and local taxation. In doing so, we assume that the tax schedules
are similarly sloped. Thus, we can simply multiply the rates by the ratio of total personal
income tax receipts to federal personal income tax receipts. In 1955—1962, state and local
tax receipts were roughly 5 percent of all personal receipts. In 1987—1997, this average grew
16to 19 percent.
We make a second adjustment to our rates. We multiply our average marginal rates
in each year by the fraction of corporate equity outside of nontaxed accounts. Income from
equity held by pension funds, individual retirement accounts, and nonproﬁt organizations
is not taxed. In Appendix B, Table B2, we report the fraction of equity held in nontaxed
accounts by category. As is clear from the table, there was little equity sheltered in these
types of accounts in the late 1950s and early 1960s. More recently, we see that a lot of
equity is tax-sheltered. The total in the period 1987—1997 is close to 50 percent. Thus, it is
quantitatively important in the later period.
We should note that the tax rate on dividends in the case of tax-deferred retirement
accounts is zero even though the contributions are taxed when they are withdrawn. Because
wage income is reduced by the amount of the contribution, one dollar invested in the equity
fund of the retirement account costs (1−τpers)V ,w h e r eτpers is the personal income tax rate.
When d of it is withdrawn, the household keeps (1−τpers)d. In terms of pricing equity, these
taxes have no eﬀect. Eﬀectively, the tax on the withdrawn income is a tax on consumption
and is like τc.
Our estimate for the average marginal tax rate on dividend income is 45.4 percent
over the period 1955—1962 and 44.2 percent in 1962. (See Table B1 in Appendix B.) Our
estimate in the period 1987—1997 is 16.9 percent on average and 18.2 percent in 1997. We
m a yb eo v e r s t a t i n gt h er a t e si nt h el a t e rp e r i o db e c a u s ew eh a v en o tt a k e ni n t oa c c o u n tt h e
eﬀect of tax-managed funds. In McGrattan and Prescott (2000), we assumed the current rate
on dividends is eﬀectively zero because individuals can avoid taxes on dividends and capital
gains by managing their portfolios in an eﬃcient way. But it is diﬃcult to estimate how
much more tax-sheltering can and is being done. Thus, we take 18.2 percent as a baseline
17and discuss later how changes in this estimate aﬀect our results.
Tax Rate on Corporate Income
T h es e c o n dt a xr a t et h a tw ec o m p u t ei st h ec o r p o r a t ei n c o m et a xr a t e ,τ1. Corporate
tax rates are constructed as the ratio of the NIPA corporate proﬁts tax liability to corporate
proﬁts. There has been some decline in this ratio between the early postwar period and today,
but it has not been as dramatic as the decline in dividend tax rates. The rates in 1962 and
2000 are 45.2 percent and 36.2 percent, respectively. Thus, the tax on dividends and the tax
on corporate proﬁts are about the same level in 1962, but are quite diﬀerent in 2000. In 2000,
the tax rate on dividends is half of the corporate income tax rate. If we used average rates,
it would be even more dramatic because the average corporate income tax rate in 1987—2000
was 39.1 percent and the average tax on dividends was 16.9 percent.
Depreciation Allowances
Finally, we have to make a small adjustment to the price of tangible capital because
of the tax treatment of depreciation. In particular, we need to compute τδ.( S e e e q u a t i o n
(25).) In Appendix A, we derived a relation for τδ; in Appendix C, we provide details on
our estimation of the rate. It turns out that the adjustments to the price are small. In the
period 1955—62, the price must be multiplied by 1−.002, and in 1987—2000, the price must be
multiplied by 1 − .021. The adjustment has a larger eﬀect on our estimate of the intangible
capital stock.
We turn next to our estimates of capital stocks.
18B. Capital Stocks
Corporate productive capital includes tangible capital — like factories, oﬃce buildings,
and machines — and intangible capital — like patents, brand names, and ﬁrm-speciﬁch u m a n
and organizational capital. A good measure of the value of these assets must include not
only those owned by U.S. corporations in the United States itself, but also those owned by
U.S. corporations’ foreign subsidiaries. In Appendix C, we describe how we estimate capital
stock values, and in this section, we describe our estimates. The values we describe are the
conventional values, namely resource costs.
Tangible Capital
Estimates of the value of some corporate assets are reported by the U.S. government.
The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides estimates of
the value of tangible corporate assets located in the United States. Adding in land and
inventories, we have an average estimate for K1m of 1.092 times GDP for 1955—1962. In
1987—2000, out estimate is 1.027 times GDP. The fact that these capital-output ratios have
changed little has led many to conclude that the recent rise in equity values is puzzling.
Intangible Capital
To construct our estimate of V , we also need values for intangible capital. To compute
the value of intangible capital, we exploit the equilibrium conditions that equate after-tax
returns for all assets. (See Appendix A.) This condition along with NIPA corporate proﬁts,
the stock of tangible assets, and the after-tax interest rate obtained from the noncorporate
sector suﬃce to determine the stock of intangible capital. In the calculations, there are
two key adjustments. First, intangible investment must be added to the NIPA concept of
proﬁts. Second, the return to tangible capital has to be adjusted to reﬂect the fact that IRS
19depreciation is not equal to true depreciation. (See Appendix C.)
When we work through these details, we ﬁnd an estimate for K1u of 0.422 times GDP
in the period 1955—62 and 0.819 times GDP in 1987—2000. These estimates indicate that
there has been a doubling in the stock of intangible capital. We may be overstating the
increase somewhat because it depends crucially on our estimates of the interest rate less the
growth rate. Our empirical estimates imply a decline in the after-tax interest rate less the
growth rate, i−γ −η, from 1.1 percent to 0.8 percent. This is signiﬁcant given the fact that
we divide proﬁts by this term. But we compute these rates over short time periods and may
have a noisy estimate of the diﬀerence.
U.S. Foreign Subsidiary Capital
We now have estimates of tangible and intangible capital located in the United States.
We also need to include tangible and intangible capital of foreign subsidiaries because our
measure of the total market value of U.S. corporations includes the value of their foreign
subsidiaries. Thus, there is a mismatch between the BEA capital stock data and the corporate
equity value of the Flow of Funds Accounts.
To avoid this mismatch, we construct a measure of the capital stock of foreign sub-
sidiaries using data on foreign proﬁts. In measuring foreign proﬁts, the BEA assumes the
same tax treatment for foreign and domestic capital. We do the same. Thus, we make the
assumption that the ratio of after-tax proﬁts to the capital stock is the same for domestic and
foreign operations. Therefore, we can estimate the value of total foreign corporate capital
before taxation of distributions using observations on domestic and foreign after-tax proﬁts
and domestic capital. The result is an after-corporate-tax estimate of value of foreign capital,
w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yK∗, equal to 0.152 times GDP for the period 1955—62 and 0.437 times
20GDP for the period 1987—2000. These estimate of foreign capital are then included in our
formula as follows:
Vt =( 1− τd)
h





We can now add up terms and compare the theoretical predictions for corporate equity
with the actual market valuations.
4. Theory and Data
In Table 1, we report our main ﬁndings. Theory’s prediction for the value of corporate
equity in 1962 is 0.82 times GDP. Theory’s prediction for the value of corporate equity in 2000
is 1.61 times GDP. Thus, our estimates of tax rates and capital stocks imply a doubling of the
value of corporate equity. This is very close to what actually occurred in the United States.
The actual values in 1962 and 2000 were 0.83 times GDP and 1.51 times GDP, respectively.
We compute the predicted contributions from the three types of capital. The after-tax
value of domestic tangible capital was 0.608 times GDP in the early period but grew to 0.822
times GDP. This increase was due entirely to the drop in dividend tax rates. The value of
domestic intangible capital was 0.129 times GDP and grew to 0.427 times GDP. Close to half
of this increase was due to the fall in tax rates, both the rate on dividend income and the
rate on corporate proﬁts. Finally, there was a signiﬁcant increase in the value of capital in
foreign subsidiaries from 0.085 to 0.357, but given our data, it is not possible to know for
sure the main source of the change. Our analysis and NIPA measurement assumes that the
tax treatment is the same for both domestic and foreign capital.
If we use our predictions for corporate equity, we can compute a price-earnings ratio.
We report predicted and actual price-earnings ratios in Table 1. In our calculations, we use
observed after-tax earnings as is done in the ﬁnance literature. We estimate a ratio of 14.1 in
211962 and 29.8 in 2000. These estimates are very close to the actual ratios of 14.2 and 28.0,
respectively. They are also close to estimates of Campbell and Shiller (2001), who look only
at the S&P 500 companies.
Importance of Decline in Dividend Tax Rate
Quantitatively, the most important change over the postwar period was the decline
in the dividend tax rate. If the rate had remained at 44.2 percent, our prediction for the
corporate equity value would have been 1.10 times GDP rather than 1.61 times GDP. (See
Appendix C for details.)
Importance of Increase in Intangible Capital
Hall (2000) has argued that a rise in the stock of intangible capital accounts for the
large increase in equity prices. We estimate that the stock of intangible capital doubled,
and its price rose signiﬁcantly because of the decline in tax rates. If the stock of intangible
capital had remained at its 1955—1962 average level of 0.422 times GDP, our prediction for
the corporate equity value would have been 1.34 times GDP instead of 1.61 times GDP. Thus,
the change in the stock of intangible capital can account for only a modest part of the large
rise in equity values since the 1960s. It is part of the story, but quantitatively by far the most
important factor is the change in the tax on dividends.
Importance of Increase in Foreign Capital
The stock of foreign capital nearly tripled, but it is still much smaller than domestic
capital. If the foreign stock had remained at 0.152 times GDP, then our prediction for the
corporate equity value would have been 1.37 times GDP.
The overall message of Table 1 is that taxation, especially taxation of dividends, can
22account for the large rise in the value of U.S. corporations.
5. Implications for Asset Returns
A large change in tax rates on dividends has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on equity returns.
Note, ﬁrst, that what is typically reported by organizations like the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) or Ibbotson Associates is
Vt+1 + dt+1
Vt
− 1( 2 7 )
whereas the relevant return for households is the post-tax return
Vt+1 +( 1− τd)dt+1
Vt
− 1. (28)
If the theory can account for the large rise in equity values, and if dividends are of the same
order of magnitude as in the data, then theory can account for the high reported returns of
the postwar.
The change in tax rates on dividends can deliver a large increase in equity values.
Dividends relative to GDP are roughly constant in the United States for much of the postwar
period. The same is true in the model since steady-state values of capital and investment do
not depend on the tax rate on dividends. We need only pick production parameters that give
roughly the right capital-output ratios.
What then is our prediction for pre-tax returns, namely (27), reported by CRSP?
This return is the sum of capital gains, Vt+1/Vt−1, and dividend yields, dt+1/Vt. The capital
gains has two components: the anticipated gain and the unanticipated gain. The anticipated
capital gain is the trend growth rate of productive assets. In the 1950s and early 1960s, we
estimated this growth to be about 3.5 percent per year. It is currently a bit lower at 3.3
percent.
23The unanticipated capital gain is the growth in the price of equity due to unanticipated
changes in tax rates. Most of this gain was due to the decline in tax rates on dividend income,
but there was also a decline due to the fall in corporate income tax rates. Furthermore, part
of the increase in foreign subsidiary capital might also have been due to the lowering of trade
barriers, which increases the price of equity.
As a baseline, consider the decline in the marginal rate on dividend income alone. It
fell from 44 percent to 18 percent in 40 years. This decline alone implies that the growth
in equity prices will be roughly [(1 − .18)/(1 − .44)]1/40 or 1 percent per year higher than
growth in GDP. If we add in all tax changes and assume a doubling of the price, then the
unanticipated gain is 21/40 or 1.8 percent per year higher than growth in GDP.
The last component of the return is the dividend yield. In the early 1960s, the dividend
yield was about 3 percent. It is currently a little over 1 percent. Most of this change is due
to the rise in equity prices, not to a decline in dividend income relative to GDP, which is
consistent with our theory. Adding the dividend yield to the capital gains, we would expect
an average pre-tax return after prices started falling in the range of 7.5 to 8.3 percent. These
predictions are consistent with the estimates of CRSP.
Eventually, the equity returns have to come down as the dividend yield falls and the
tax rates level out. Our prediction for future returns is a little over 4 percent.
If we additionally assume that households had a liquidity motive for holding debt and
constraints on their retirement assets, we predict low bond returns and large equity premia.13
In the ﬁrst half of the postwar period, pension funds and life insurance reserves were almost
entirely debt. There are good reasons for this. There were no clear guidelines for ﬁduciaries,
who could be penalized for imprudent investments. In 1974, ERISA was passed and ﬁduciary
responsibilities and liabilities were speciﬁed very clearly. Before 1970, less than 10 percent of
24retirement assets were equity assets. Today, they are close to 50 percent. There has been a
signiﬁc a n ts h i f to v e rt h ep o s t w a rp e r i o d .
6. Conclusions
With the large reduction in individual income tax rates, the increased opportunities
to hold equity in nontaxed pension plans, and the increases in intangible and foreign capital,
theory predicts a large increase in equity prices between 1962 and 2000. In fact, theory
predicts a doubling of the value of equity relative to GDP and a doubling of the price-earnings
ratio.
A corollary of this ﬁnding is that there is no equity premium puzzle in the postwar
period. Mehra and Prescott (1985) found that the high return on equity relative to debt was
not due to a premium for bearing non-diversiﬁable risk. This led them to label the diﬀerence
in average returns a puzzle. They did not consider changes in tax and regulatory policies
or institutions aﬀecting asset markets. We do, and we ﬁnd that the data — at least over the
postwar period — are not puzzling.
25Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
In this appendix, we provide proofs for propositions 3 and 4 of Section 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Use (17) and (19) to replace x1m,t and x1u,t, respectively, in the
corporate ﬁrm’s problem (16). The maximization problem then is to maximize (16) subject
to
(1 + η)k1m,t+1 − (1 − δ1m)k1m,t =( 1+η)ˆ k1m,t+1 − (1 − ˆ δ1m)ˆ k1m,t. (A1)



























2,t+1 +1− δ1u (A4)
where λt is the multiplier on (A1) normalized by pt and fc
j,t is the partial derivative of
fc(k1m,t,k 1u,t,z tn1,t) with respect to its jth argument.




V1s,t+1 +( 1− τd)d1,t+1
V1s,t
(A5)
which relates the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution to the gross return on equity.
Multiply (A2) by (1 − τd)(1 − λt)k1m,t+1,( A 3 )b y( 1− τd)λtˆ k1m,t+1,a n d( A 4 )b y
(1 − τd)(1 − τ1)k1u,t+1. The resulting equation is consistent with (A5) if and only if
V1s,t =( 1− τd)(1 + η)
h
(1 − λt)k1m,t+1 + λtˆ k1m,t+1 +( 1− τ1)k1u,t+1
i
. (A6)
26We now show that on a balanced growth path
(1 − λ)k1m,t+1 + λˆ k1m,t+1 =( 1− τδ)k1m,t+1 (A7)
where τδ is deﬁned in (25). On a balanced growth path, the net interest rate, which we
denote as i,i se q u a lt o( 1+η)pt/pt+1 − 1. Using (A3), we have
λ =
τ1ˆ δ1m
i + ˆ δ1m
. (A8)
Using (A1), we have
ˆ k1m,t+1 =
Ã
(1 + η)(1 + γ) − 1+δ1m
(1 + η)(1 + γ) − 1+ˆ δ1m
!
k1m,t+1. (A9)
Substituting (A8) and (A9) into the left-hand side of (A7) gives the expression for τδ.14
Substituting (A7) into (A6) gives us the expression for the equity price that we seek.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since we assume that it is constant, the tax rate on dividend
income, τd,o n l ya ﬀects the household ﬁrst-order condition relating the marginal rate of
substitution and the return on equity. See (A5). It appears in no other ﬁrst-order condition
of the households and no ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrms. To compute the steady-state
quantities for this economy, (A5) is not used. Therefore, the capital-output ratios do not
depend on τd.
27Appendix B. Tax Rates on Dividend Income
In this appendix, we describe how we estimate tax rates on dividend income for the
periods 1955—1962 and 1987—1997. The data for 1997 are the latest available.15 The sources
of our data in this exercise are the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Statistics of Income
(SOI), the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ national income and product accounts (NIPA) in
the Survey of Current Business (SCB), the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States, and the Investment Company Institute’s Mutual Fund Fact Book.
Personal taxes on dividend income are paid by individuals who ﬁle the 1040 form with
the IRS and by ﬁduciaries who ﬁle the 1041 form. The IRS compiles information from these
tax forms in its Statistics of Income. It reports sources of income and taxable income from
the ﬁled returns for many income categories. In the case of individual returns (1040), the IRS
also reports information by marital status: married ﬁling jointly, married ﬁling separately,
single, surviving spouse, or head of household.
From the SOI data, we can construct the marginal tax rate paid by a typical ﬁler
in each income and marital category. For each group, we take reported taxable income for
at y p i c a lﬁler, and we use the IRS tax schedule relevant to this group. To compute an
average marginal rate in a given year, we weight the rate for each income-marital group by
the fraction of dividend income earned by this group.16 In the case of nontaxable returns,
we use a marginal tax rate of 0 and the dividend income these ﬁlers report. In Table B1, we
report the results of these computations for the years 1955 through 1962 and 1987 through
1997.
For ﬁduciary returns, we have much less data available. We have statistics for even
years in the early period and for 1997 only in the later period. For the tax rates in the early
odd years, we use the tax rates in the subsequent year. For example, for the tax rate in 1955,
28we use our estimate from 1956. In the later period, we use the 1997 tax rate in all years.
To construct a single rate for both types of returns, we use the fraction of dividend
income reported on the 1040s and the 1041s to weight the respective tax rates. We have to
estimate the taxable dividend income on the 1041s because part of the income is distributed
to individuals (who then report it on their Form 1040). We know the total amount of income
distributed. We assume that all types of income (dividends, interest, etc.) are distributed
proportionally. Taxable dividend income for a particular 1041 ﬁler is therefore assumed to
be total dividend income multiplied by the fraction of income that is not distributed. The
average of the 1040 rates and 1041 rates is reported under “average marginal rate for both
1040 and 1041.”
Income taxes are also paid to state and local governments. To adjust for state and
local taxes in a particular year, we multiply our estimate of the average marginal rate in
that year by the ratio of total personal income tax receipts to federal personal income tax
receipts. Data on receipts are taken from SCB NIPA Tables 3.2 and 3.3. This is a reasonable
procedure for adjusting the rates if federal, state, and local tax schedules have similar slopes.
To get our ﬁnal estimates, we make one ﬁnal adjustment. We multiply the marginal
rates by the fraction of equity held outside of tax-sheltered accounts. In Table B2, we report
fractions of total equity held in sheltered pension funds, IRAs, and portfolios of tax-exempt
nonproﬁt organizations.
Data on non-IRA pension funds are taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts.T o
estimate the equity holdings in these funds, we add corporate equities of private pension
funds (FOF Table L.119), state and local government employee retirement funds (FOF Table
L.120), and tax-exempt life insurance reserves (FOF Table B.100e).
Some corporate equity in the pension funds are held in the form of mutual funds. We
29estimate the equity fraction of mutual fund holding by taking the ratio of all mutual fund
equity to total mutual fund assets (FOF Tables B.100 and B.100e).
To estimate equity holdings of IRA accounts, we use data reported in the Investment
Company Institute’s Mutual Fund Fact Book. It reports total IRA asset holdings back to
1981. Our estimate of the share of equity holdings is 77 percent, which is the actual share
the Institute reports for 2000.
The third category of nontaxed equity is equity held by nonproﬁt organizations. These
data are reported in the Flow of Funds Accounts for the years 1987—1997. Adding the retire-
ment equity and the nonproﬁt equity, we get our estimate of the fraction of equity that is
tax-sheltered. We use this estimate to adjust our marginal tax rate. This is how we get the
last column of Table B1.
30Table B1. Derivation of the Tax Rates on Dividend Income, 1955-62 and 1987-97
Average Marginal Rate Average Marginal Adjustment for Adjustment for
Rate for Both State and Local Tax-Sheltered
Year Form 1040 Form 1041a 1040 & 1041b Income Taxes Accounts
1955 47.9 34.4 46.5 48.5 46.8
1956 47.8 34.4 46.4 48.6 46.9
1957 46.7 29.5 44.9 47.1 45.2
1958 46.1 29.5 44.3 46.6 44.6
1959 47.7 31.7 46.1 48.7 46.4
1960 45.1 31.7 43.7 46.3 43.8
1961 46.0 33.6 44.7 47.7 44.9
1962 45.1 33.6 43.9 47.0 44.2
Avg. 1955-62 46.6 32.3 45.1 47.5 45.4
1987 28.3 36.3 28.9 35.2 18.5
1988 24.9 36.3 25.8 31.5 17.2
1989 24.3 36.3 25.2 31.0 16.7
1990 24.3 36.3 25.2 31.0 15.2
1991 24.7 36.3 25.6 31.8 16.6
1992 24.8 36.3 25.7 32.2 16.7
1993 26.5 36.3 27.3 34.1 17.0
1994 26.7 36.3 27.4 34.2 15.8
1995 27.4 36.3 28.1 34.9 16.8
1996 28.9 36.3 29.5 36.3 17.5
1997 29.0 36.3 29.6 36.2 18.2
Avg. 1987-97 26.3 36.3 27.1 33.5 16.9
a Data on ﬁduciary returns are only available for years 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, and 1997. Our estimate for the tax rates in 1955, 1957,
1959, and 1961 is the tax rate in each subsequent year. Our estimate of tax rates in years 1987 through 1996 is the 1997 estimate.
b For years 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, we assume that the ratio of 1040 dividend income to 1041 dividend income is the same as in
each subsequent year. For years 1987 through 1996, we assume that the ratio of 1040 dividend income to 1041 dividend income is
the same as in 1997.
31Table B2. Fraction of Equity Held in Retirement Accounts and
by Nonprofit Organizations, 1955-62 and 1987-97
Year Pensions IRAs Nonproﬁtsa Total
1955 3.5 0 NA 3.5
1956 3.5 0 NA 3.5
1957 4.0 0 NA 4.0
1958 4.3 0 NA 4.3
1959 4.8 0 NA 4.8
1960 5.3 0 NA 5.3
1961 5.8 0 NA 5.8
1962 5.8 0 NA 5.8
Avg. 1955-62 4.6 0 NA 4.6
1987 30.2 11.9 5.3 47.4
1988 27.9 12.2 5.2 45.4
1989 28.1 12.0 6.0 46.1
1990 29.6 15.1 6.3 51.0
1991 29.3 13.4 5.0 47.7
1992 29.6 13.4 5.0 48.0
1993 31.4 13.7 5.0 50.0
1994 33.4 14.7 5.7 53.8
1995 33.1 13.2 5.5 51.8
1996 33.7 12.6 5.7 51.0
1997 33.0 11.4 5.4 49.8
Avg. 1987-97 30.8 13.1 5.5 49.4
a Data on nonproﬁt equity holdings are only available for the period 1987-1997. See the Flow of Funds for details.
32Appendix C. Derivation of Corporate Equity Value
In this appendix, we describe how we estimate the corporate equity value using data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Survey of Current Business (SCB), the Federal
Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States (FOF), and our estimates of
tax rates on dividend income. (See Appendix B.) Data from the SCB include the national
income and product accounts (NIPA) and their estimates of ﬁxed assets (FA).
We ﬁrst show how we organize the national accounts to be consistent with our theory.
In Table C1, we report average values of domestic income for the United States for the periods
1955—1962 and 1987—2000. All values are relative to GDP (SCB NIPA Table 1.1).
We split income into “corporate” and “noncorporate,” where noncorporate income is
the diﬀerence between total domestic income and the domestic income of corporate business.
Values for corporate income are taken from NIPA Table 1.16 in SCB. Values for noncorporate
capital consumptions are the diﬀerence between the total (SCB NIPA Table 1.9) and corpo-
rate capital consumption (SCB NIPA Table 1.16). Values for other noncorporate income are
taken from SCB NIPA Tables 1.14 and 1.15.
The middle column of Table C1 relates the NIPA system of accounts to the model
system of accounts. The notation is consistent with our model of Section 2B. We have
introduced notation for the rental rates on capital. These rates are r1m = p1∂fc/∂k1m,
r1u = p1∂fc/∂k1u,a n dr2 = p2∂fnc/∂k2.
The gross domestic income (line 19) shows the relation between the model’s concept
of income and the NIPA concept of income. There are four diﬀerences. First, NIPA income
includes sales and excise taxes. These taxes are consumption taxes in the model and are
excluded from both income and product. Second, NIPA income does not include intangible
33investment. U.S. corporations can expense intangible investment, but we treat it as an invest-
ment in our model. We therefore add it to our model’s corporate income and to investment.
Third, NIPA income excludes capital consumption of durable goods. Purchases of durable
goods are treated as consumption in NIPA and investment in our model. We therefore must
include capital consumption on durable goods in our income concept. We denote this by
δ2kcd,w h e r ekcd is the stock of consumer durables. Fourth, NIPA does not impute services
to durable goods or to government investment goods. These are investments in our model,
and we therefore impute services to them. We denote the after-tax return by i and the stock
of government capital by kg.
In Table C2, we report the product side of the NIPA accounts, values for domestic
capital stocks, and net foreign proﬁts. Values for domestic product are taken from SCB NIPA
Table 1.1. The measures of corporate and noncorporate investment are taken from the Flow
of Funds Accounts, Table F6. In both the model and NIPA accounts, incomes and products
must equal. In line 7, we show that the diﬀerence between model and data incomes is equal
to the diﬀerence between model and data products.
The Survey of Current Business also reports estimates of capital stocks (or, ﬁxed
assets) which we use for our estimation of corporate equity. In Table C2, we report ra-
tios of corporate and noncorporate stocks to GDP. Our measured corporate capital includes
structures, plant and equipment, inventories, and land. Structures and plant and equipment
account for most of the capital; with nonresidential and residential included, the average
value of these stocks as measured by the BEA was 0.816 times GDP in 1955—1962 and 0.829
times GDP in 1987—2000 (SCB FA Tables 7KCU and 9KCU). We include inventories taken
from the national accounts (SCB NIPA Table 5.12) in our measure of corporate capital. The
value of inventories was 0.242 times GDP in 1955—1962 and 0.165 times GDP in 1987—2000.
34The BEA reports estimates for the structures but not for the land they are on. To get an
estimate of the value of corporate land, we took values from corporate tax returns. In both
periods, we found similar estimates, namely 0.034 times GDP in 1955—1962 and 0.033 in
1987—2000.
We need estimates for the value of noncorporate capital because we use them to
estimate interest rates in our two periods. In Table C2, we report BEA estimates for total
noncorporate capital and show how much of this is government capital and consumer durables.
As noted above, we use capital stocks for government capital and consumer durables to adjust
the national accounts.
We do not include land values in our noncorporate capital stock measure because most
of the return on land over the postwar period was due to capital gains, which are diﬃcult to
estimate. Since these gains are not included in the noncorporate proﬁts measure of the SCB,
we exclude land from our noncorporate capital measure.
The only capital stock measures that we have from the BEA are for capital stocks
located in the United States. Many corporations have capital in foreign subsidiaries, and
foreign production aﬀects their stock values. In order to estimate the capital stocks of foreign
subsidiaries we capitalize their proﬁt ﬂows. In Table C2, we report net after-tax foreign
proﬁts (SCB NIPA Table 6.16).
We use net after-tax proﬁts from abroad because shares for ﬁrms like Toyota are issued
through the parent company in Japan and trade on the New York Stock Exchange as issues
of American Depository Receipts (ADR). These ADRs are not included in the Flow of Funds
market value of domestic corporations. They appear separately as “rest of the world” issues.
(See FOF Table L.213.) Therefore, we need to net out the proﬁts of these corporations when
computing our capital stocks.
35Table C3 shows how we use the SCB and SOI data to construct our estimate of
corporate equity values. We ﬁrst compute the growth rate of real GDP. We then compute
tax rates on corporate income and income distributed to households. The corporate tax rate
is derived from the income side of the national accounts, which reports before- and after-tax
proﬁts. The distribution tax derivation is described in Appendix B.
In order to compute service ﬂows for our accounts and to compute our intangible
capital, we need an estimate for the after-tax real interest rate. We use noncorporate proﬁts
and capital for this calculation. To make the model and NIPA accounts consistent, we have to
make two adjustments to noncorporate proﬁts. First, we add imputed services to consumer
durables and to government capital, which is equal to i(kcd+kg). Notice that this depends on
i so we are in eﬀect solving a ﬁxed point problem. Second, we subtract intermediate ﬁnancial
services that are not included in our model accounts. These services are primarily the interest
received by households who lend to ﬁnancial institutions issuing mortgages. They are equal
to roughly half of the net interest reported in noncorporate income. The remainder includes
forgone interest of individuals holding currency and checking accounts.17
N e x t ,w en e e dt om a k ea d j u s t m e n t st ot h er e t u r na n dp r i c eo ft a n g i b l ec a p i t a lb e c a u s e
the IRS allowable depreciation is diﬀerent from the true economic depreciation reported in
the Survey of Current Business. In Table C1 (line 7), there is an adjustment to proﬁts that
is the estimate of the diﬀerence between IRS depreciation and economic depreciation. We
use this term along with observed tangible capital to estimate the book value of capital and
the depreciation rate used by the IRS. These estimates can be used to determine the needed
adjustments to the price of capital and the return to corporate measured capital. The price
of capital is adjusted by 1 − τδ. The after-tax return on tangible capital is also adjusted
by ˆ i − i. These terms are equal to 0 if the depreciation allowed is equal to true economic
36depreciation.
To compute intangible capital, we assume that after-tax real returns to all assets,
namely corporate measured capital, corporate unmeasured capital, and noncorporate capital
are the same. The expression for intangible capital requires some algebra, but the main
steps are as follows. First, note that for the model in equilibrium, (r1m − δ1m − τ1k)k1m =
ˆ ik1m/(1 − τ1), which are before-tax proﬁts accruing to tangible capital. Second note that
r1uk1u − x1u =( i − γ − η)k1u, which are before-tax proﬁts accruing to intangible capital less
intangible investment. The sum of these two is what NIPA reports for corporate proﬁts (after
adjustments for depreciation). If we add them, we can use our estimates of ˆ i, k1m, τ1, i,a n d
γ+η, along with the NIPA proﬁts to estimate k1u. Note that this calculation does not require
us to know the rate of depreciation of intangible capital.
With measures of domestic tangible corporate capital and domestic intangible cor-
porate capital, we can construct a measure of the value of total domestic corporate capital
before taxation of distributions, k. The prices of tangible and intangible capital are not
the same because they are taxed diﬀerently. The total value of domestic capital is equal to
(1−τδ)k1m +(1−τ1)k1u.T h eτδ term is the adjustment to the price of corporate measured
capital due to depreciation allowances described above. The price of intangible is one minus
the corporate tax rate because of the fact that intangible investment can be expensed and
therefore avoids income taxation.
For foreign subsidiaries, we observe only proﬁt ﬂows. We make the assumption that the
ratio of after-tax proﬁts to the capital stock is the same for domestic and foreign operations.
Therefore, we can estimate the value of total foreign corporate capital before taxation of
distributions, k∗, using observations on domestic and foreign after-tax proﬁts and domestic
capital.
37To compute our predicted value of corporate equity, we multiply k+k∗ by 1−τd,w h e r e
τd is the tax rate on dividend income described in Appendix B. To compute the price-earnings
ratio, we divide the total value by measured after-tax earnings. We use measured after-tax
earnings because this is what is reported in other studies. (See, for example, Campbell and
Shiller 2001.) The results are reported in the last two rows of Table C3.
38Table C1. U.S. Domestic Income, 1955:1962 and 1987:2000
Averages fora
Model Expression 1955-62 1987-00
Corporate Domestic Income
1 Capital consumption δ1mk1m 0.046 0.069
2 IBT+transfers−subsidiesc τ1kk1m + ω1τcc 0.054 0.057
3 Compensation wn1 0.357 0.380
4 Proﬁts (r1m−δ1m−τ1k)k1m+r1uk1u−x1u 0.097 0.071
5 Proﬁts tax liability τ1[(r1m−τ1k)k1m−ˆ δ1mˆ k1m+r1uk1u−x1u] 0.045 0.026
6 Proﬁts after tax (1 − τ1)[(r1m−τ1k)k1m−ˆ δ1mˆ k1m+r1uk1u−x1u] 0.052 0.042
7 Adjustments to proﬁts ˆ δ1mˆ k1m − δ1mk1m 0.000 0.003
8 Net Interestb -0.001 0.018
Noncorporate Domestic Income
9 Capital consumption δ2(k2 − kcd) 0.062 0.054
10 IBT+transfers−subsidiesc τ2kk2 + ω2τcc 0.030 0.023
11 Compensation wn2 0.282 0.246
12 Wages and salaries 0.199 0.192
13 80% of proprietor’s income 0.083 0.054
14 Proﬁts r2k2 − δ2k2 − τ2kk2 − i(kcd + kg) 0.070 0.080
15 20% of proprietor’s income 0.021 0.014
16 Rental income 0.030 0.012
17 Net interestb 0.019 0.054
18 Statistical Discrepancy 0.001 0.002






a All values are relative to gross domestic product.
b This category includes intermediate ﬁnancial services which are not included in our model concept.
c Fraction ωi of sales and excise taxes are included in sector i’s indirect business tax.
39Table C2. U.S. Domestic Product, Capital Stocks, and Foreign Profit, 1955:1962 and 1987:2000
Averages fora
Model Expression 1955-62 1987-00
Domestic Product
1 Private consumptionb c(1 + τc) −δ2kcd − ikcd 0.542 0.585
2 Govt. consumption g 0.164 0.157
3 Investment 0.294 0.258
4 Corporate
5 Measured x1m 0.073 0.100
6 Noncorporate x2 0.221 0.158
7 Gross Domestic Productb c + x1m + x1u + x2 + g
| {z }
Model product






8 Measured k1m 1.092 1.027
9 Noncorporate k2 2.363 2.176
10 Government kg 0.720 0.598
11 Consumer durables kcd 0.332 0.290
12 Other 1.310 1.288
13 Foreign After-tax Profits ik∗ − (1 − τ1)x∗
1u 0.006 0.012
a,b See footnotes for Table C1.
40Table C3. Calculations for Corporate Equity Value, 1955:1962 and 1987:2000
Model Expression and Calculation 1955-62 1987-00
Average Growth in Real GDP 100(γ + η) 3.523 3.312
Corporate Tax Ratesa
Income tax τ1 = (Table C1, line 5)/(Table C1, line 5 + line 6) 0.452 0.362
Distribution taxb τd 0.442 0.182
Interest Rate (%) i = r2 − δ2 − τ2k 4.630 4.120
Noncorporate proﬁts Table C1, line 14 0.070 0.080
Plus: imputed capital services i (Table C2, line 10 + line 11) 0.049 0.037
Less: intermediate ﬁnancial services 1/2 (Table C1, line 17) 0.009 0.027
Divided by: capital stock Table C2, line 9 2.363 2.176
Depreciation Adjustments
Corporate measured capital k1m = Table C2, line 8 1.092 1.027
Book capital ˆ k1m = k1m− (Table C1, line 7)/ (γ + η) 1.103 0.942
Economic depreciation δ1m = (Table C1, line 1)/ k1m 0.042 0.067
Depreciation allowance ˆ δ1m =( T a b l eC 1 ,l i n e1+l i n e7 )/ˆ k1m 0.043 0.077
Capital price adjustment τδ = τ1ˆ δ1m(ˆ δ1m − δ1m)/[(γ + η + ˆ δ1m)(i + ˆ δ1m)] 0.002 0.021
Corporate return adjustment (%) ˆ i = i + τ1[δ1m − ˆ δ1m(i + δ1m)/(i + ˆ δ1m)] 4.642 4.005
Intangible Capital k1u = [Table C1, line 4 −ˆ ik1m/(1 − τ1)]/(i − γ − η) 0.422 0.819
Domestic Capital k =( 1− τδ)k1m +( 1− τ1)k1u 1.321 1.528
Foreign Subsidiary Capital k∗ = k (Table C2, line 13)/(Table C1, line 6) 0.152 0.437
Corporate Equity Value V =( 1− τd)[k + k∗] 0.822 1.608
Price-Earnings Ratio V / (Table C1, line 6 + Table C2, line 13) 14.118 29.823
a Rates in last year of period.
b See Appendix B for details on the distribution tax.
41Notes
1Here pension funds include annuities provided by life insurance companies.
2One exception was CREF, whose creation required a special New York State law.
3See, for example, Abel (1990), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2000), Constan-
tinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Epstein and Zin (1989,1991), Gali (1994),
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), and Jermann (1998). See also Kocherlakota (1996)
for an excellent survey of the literature.
4New theories emphasizing risk premia have largely ignored an older literature that
emphasizes the interaction of public ﬁnance and ﬁnance. See, for example, Feldstein (1980a,
1980b) and Feldstein and Green (1983).
5We abstract from corporate debt because corporations were close to 100 percent equity-
ﬁnanced in the time periods we consider.
6Here, we abstract from all forms of heterogeneity in individuals. We view this as
a ﬁrst step toward understanding the interaction of stock values and the U.S. tax system.
Obvious extensions would allow for individuals of diﬀerent ages, incomes, and abilities. See,
for example, the work of Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra
(2000), and Heaton and Lucas (1996).
7Because of our emphasis on taxation as a key factor for postwar asset prices, we
analyze a production economy. See also Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2000), Cochrane
(1991), Hall (1999), and Jermann (1998), who study asset pricing in production economies.
8See for example, King (1977), Auerbach (1979), Summers (1981), and Summers and
Poterba (1985).
9We have not included investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation in this analysis
because they were not a factor during the periods we consider. However, increased invest-
ment credits and accelerated depreciation do aﬀect the price of capital, both make investing
cheaper. Part of the fall in equity prices during the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to
increased investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances.
10In writing the corporate ﬁrm’s problem, we have ignored debt ﬁnancing. In both the
1960s and the 1990s debt-equity ratios were very low. There is a good theoretical explanation
42for the 1960s. If τd > τ1, then the ﬁrm would choose only equity ﬁnancing because the
household has a heavy tax burden when initially shifting from equity to debt and this cost
is not outweighed by future beneﬁts from tax deductions of interest payments. In the 1990s,
τd < τ1, which would imply that debt ﬁnancing should dominate equity ﬁnancing. The
fact that ﬁrms did not debt-ﬁnance in this case is not really well understood. See Auerbach
(2000).
11U.S. households also have net holdings of corporate and foreign debt, but the value of
these holdings is quantitatively small. To avoid cumbersome notation, we do not explicitly
introduce them.
12See Employee Beneﬁts Law (1991) and Primer on ERISA Fiduciary Duties (1994) for
more details on the history of beneﬁts law.
13Our model abstracts from factors giving rise to a liquidity demand for debt assets.
See Bansal and Coleman (1996) who introduce a wedge between cash and debt assets held
for pure investment purposes.
14Here and elsewhere we ignore the term γη since it is too small to aﬀect any of our
estimates.
15In the early period that we consider, most distributions were made by issuing dividends
rather than by buying back shares. Any pro rata redemptions were considered equivalent to
a taxable dividend. In the later period, capital gains were taxed as ordinary income so there
was no advantage to buy-backs. See Chapter 9 of Bittker and Eustice (2000).
16In the years 1987—1997, the IRS reports dividend income by adjusted income class
only for all returns. We compute a marginal rate for each marital class by using taxable
income from all returns along with that marital class’ tax schedule. We weight the results
using total dividend income earned by that marital group.
17See McGrattan and Prescott (2000) for more details on estimation of intermediate
ﬁnancial services.
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Domestic tangible capital .608 .822
Domestic intangible capital .129 .427
Foreign capital .085 .357





a Corporate equity values are relative to the value of gross domestic product.
b Capital stocks and earnings are averaged over the periods, and corporate equity values
are end-of-period.
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